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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant, Medical Recovery Services, LLC. sued defendant, Jared Neumeier, for the
payment of a medical bill that was nearly two years and six months past due. Jared Neumeier's
defense was that he never got a copy of the bill and that he had insurance that would pay for
the bill. The Magistrate Court agreed with this argument on summary judgment concluding
that the fact Jared Neumeier had insurance and did not receive a bill before being sued meant
that Jared Neumeier acted "objectively reasonably" in not paying the bill. Moreover, since the
insurer paid 100% of the bill after the lawsuit was filed, Medical Recovery Services, LLC. did not
recover an affirmative judgment thereby making Jared Neumeier the prevailing party entitled
to costs and attorney's fees.
On appeal, the District Court went in a totally different direction than the Magistrate
Court. The District Court held that a patient owes a medical provider nothing until the amount
he owes becomes "determinable." The bill for a patient who has insurance becomes
"determinable" only after the medical insurer pays all or part ofthe bill. Therefore, given that
Jared Neumeier's medical insurer paid 100% of the amount sought in the lawsuit (albeit nearly
three months after the lawsuit was filed), Jared Neumeier owed nothing to the medical
provider at the time of summary judgment making summary judgment in favor of Neumeier
proper. Moreover, since Medical Recovery Services, LLC. was not entitled to any affirmative
judgment, it was not the prevailing party and could not recover any prejudgment interest. In
fact, Jared Neumeier was the prevailing party entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 30, 2012, the defendant, Jared Neumeier, ("Neumeier"), received
medical services from Dr. Eric Baird at which time Neumeier provided Dr. Baird with "insurance
information." 1 For some unknown reason, whether Neumeier's "insurance information" was
incomplete, illegible, did not provide coverage, or whether Dr. Baird's billing staff made an
error, Dr. Baird did not use Neumeier's "insurance information" that Neumeier provided on
November 30, 2012. 2 Neumeier does not ever explain the nature ofthe "insurance
information" he provided Dr. Baird; therefore, the record is undeveloped whether that was an
insurance card, information on a sign in sheet, just the name "Blue Shield," or whether
Neumeier even provided correct and legible policy and/or group numbers. 3
Dr. Baird's office sent demand letters for payment to Neumeier at the wrong address4
until April 4, 2014 when Dr. Baird stopped sending letters and turned the account to MRS for
collections. 5 Medical Recovery Services, LLC., ("MRS"), sent collection letters to the wrong
address for Neumeier until April 27, 2015, when MRS obtained the correct address and sent
Neumeier a 10-day demand letter that he admits he received. 6 That collection letter told
Neumeier he had a delinquent account and 10 days to respond. 7 Because Neumeier was on
vacation, he did not open the letter until May 16, 2015, a Saturday. 8

1

R Vol. I, p. 19.
R Vol. I, p. 19.
3 R Vol. I, pp. 18-20 and 106-110.
4 Neumeier's correct address was 3059 Skyview Drive, but the letters went to 3059 Skyline Drive.
5 R Vol. I, pp. 19 and 71.
6 R Vol. I, pp. 19 and 71.
7 R Vol. I, p. 72.
8 R Vol. I, pp. 107, 108 and 109.
2
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On Monday May 18, 2015, instead of contacting MRS in response to the collection
letter, Neumeier contacted Dr. Baird's office who told Neumeier his account had already gone
to MRS for collections. 9 According to Neumeier, not until the next day on May 19, 2015 did
Neumeier contact MRS who told him that it was "too late." 10 Unfortunately, Neumeier did not
contact MRS on May 18, 2015 because MRS has a policy to put an "insurance hold" on an
account if a person contacts MRS while awaiting insurance payments. 11 In other words, if
Neumeier had contacted MRS on May 18, 2015 before the Complaint was filed at 4:01 p.m.,
MRS would not have filed suit but would have put the account on hold while awaiting his
insurance payment. 12 Instead, having not received a response from Neumeier, MRS sent the
account on May 14, 2015 to its attorneys who filed the Complaint in this matter on May 18,
2015 at 4:01 p.m. 13
The Complaint sought the principle amount of $958.63 plus statutory prejudgment
interest of $282.39, attorney's fees and costs. 14 After MRS served the Complaint on Neumeier,
Neumeier disclosed that he had insurance to cover the bill. 15 Dr. Baird's office billed the
insurance and received payment in full three months later on August 27, 2015. 16 The record
and specifically the Affidavits of Neumeier contain no evidence that the nondescript "insurance

9

R Vol. I, pp. 108 and 109.
R Vol. I, pp. 108 and 109.
11 R Vol. I, p. 72.
12 R Vol. I, p. 72.
13 R Vol. I, pp. 8, 35, 72, 108, and 109.
14 R Vol. I, p. 9.
15 R Vol. I, pp. 19 and 22.
16 R Vol. I, pp. 19 and 35.
10
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information" that lead to the payment on or about August 27, 2015 was the same "insurance
information" Neumeier provided nearly three years earlier on November 30, 2012. 17
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On September 25, 2015, and after the principle amount was paid, Neumeier made a
motion to dismiss, 18 and MRS objected to the motion. 19 The Magistrate Court ultimately
converted the motion to dismiss and MRS' opposition to the motion to dismiss as cross motions
for summary judgment in which both parties sought judgment in their favor. 20
On November 23, 2015, the Magistrate Court granted summary judgment in favor of
Neumeier finding that "[w]hether it is a zero dollar summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff
or summary judgment in favor of Neumeier the net result is in favor of Neumeier." 21 The
Magistrate Court also made the erroneous finding that the "defendant was prevented from
paying the bill by operation of the provider's failures," 22 meaning that the provider did not bill
Neumeier's insurance properly or send billings to the proper address. 23 The Magistrate Court
concluded that if Neumeier "had not had insurance the Court would have found that his failure
to pay [for nearly three years] was not objectively reasonable; with insurance the Court can
conclude that it was." 24

17

R Vol.
R Vol.
19 R Vol.
20 R Vol.
21 R Vol.
22 R Vol.
23 R Vol.
24 R Vol.

18

I,
I,
I,
I,
I,
I,
I,
I,

pp. 18-20 and 106-110.
pp. 15-17.
pp. 17-33.
pp. 47-52.
p. 52.
p. 51.
p. 51.
p. 52.
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On November 23, 2015, the Magistrate Court also entered judgment in favor of
Neumeier, 25 and the Magistrate Court awarded Neumeier attorney's fees and costs. 26
On December 9, 2015, MRS moved to Set Aside Judgment on the grounds that the
Magistrate Court had not decided the issue of prejudgment interest. 27
On December 29, 2015, the Magistrate Court set aside the judgment and allowed the
parties to file supplemental briefing on the issue of statutory prejudgment interest pursuant to

I.C. § 18-22-104. 28
On February 22, 2016, the Magistrate Court denied MRS' motion for prejudgment
interest stating that "[i]nterest is calculated on a percentage of the amount owed and not the
amount claimed in the complaint." 29 The Magistrate Court again awarded additional attorney's
fees and costs to Neumeier. 30
On March 3, 2016, the Magistrate Court entered judgment in favor of Neumeier
awarding Neumeier costs and attorney's fees. 31
On March 17, 2016, MRS filed a timely motion for reconsideration on the grounds that
(1) the Magistrate Court had raised issues previously that MRS may not have had an assignment
that allowed MRS to step in the shoes ofthe provider; and (2) Neumeier's failure to receive

25

R Vol.
R Vol.
27 R Vol.
28 R Vol.
29 R Vol.
30 R Vol.
31 R Vol.
26

I, p. 46.
I, pp. 46 and 52.
I, pp. 65-70.
I, p. 99.
I, pp. 127-131.
I, p. 130.
I, pp. 143-144.
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billing statements was not a defense to the underlying obligation to pay for the services
received. 32
On April 29, 2016, the Magistrate Court denied the motion for reconsideration
concluding that (1) MRS did have a proper assignment for the lawsuit; (2) Neumeier's receipt of
billings is not the issue because Neumeier owed MRS nothing at the time of summary
judgment; and (3) Neumeier acted reasonably under the circumstances.
On May 6, 2016, MRS filed a Notice of Appeal. 33
On May 9, 2016, the Magistrate Court entered a First Amended Judgment awarding
Neumeier additional attorney's fees totaling $6,958.00 and costs of $138.00. 34
On May 11, 2016, MRS filed a timely Amended Notice of Appeal. 35
On December 13, 2016, the District Court entered its Opinion and Order On Appeal
affirming the Magistrate Court. 36 The District Court reasoned that a patient owes the medical
provider nothing until the amount he owes becomes "determinable." 37 The bill for a patient
who has insurance becomes "determinable" only after the medical insurer pays all or part of
the bill. 38 Therefore, given that Neumeier's medical insurer paid 100% of the amount sought in
this lawsuit (albeit nearly three months after MRS filed the lawsuit), Neumeier owed nothing to
the medical provider at the time of summary judgment making summary judgment in favor of

32
33

34

35
36

37
38

R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.

I,
I,
I,
I,
I,
I,
I,

pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.

151-158.
180-182.
183-184.
190-192.
75-81.
p. 79.
p. 79.
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Neumeier proper. 39 Since MRS was not entitled to any judgment, MRS was not a prevailing
party and could not recover any prejudgment interest. 40
In essence, the District Court ruled that in all cases involving medical debt, a medical
insurer's payment on or toward a medical charge is a condition precedent to the patient's duty
to pay the medical provider.
On January 4, 2017, the District Court entered an Order awarding Neumeier $5,361.75
for attorney's fees on appeal. 41
On January 20, 2017, MRS filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 42
I.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

A.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DETERMINED
THAT NEUMEIER PREVAILED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT?

B.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMM ITT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT NEUMEIER WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY?

C.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMM ITT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT MRS SHOULD BE AWARDED NO
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST?

D.

39
40

41
42

R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.

I,
I,
I,
I,

IS MRS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 1.C.
12-120(1). (3) AND (5) AND I.A.R. 40 AND 41?

p. 79.
pp. 79-81.
pp. 302-303.
pp. 305-307.
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11.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its capacity as an appellate
court:
[t]he Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's
findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those
findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's
decision as a matter of procedure. Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970,
973 (2012) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760
(2008))."
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC., v. MacDonald, Docket No. 43346, 2017 WL 2376426, at *l,

*2 (Idaho June 1, 2019).
"Thus, this Court does not review the decision of the magistrate court." Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154
Idaho 855, 859 (2013). "Rather, we [this Court] are 'procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the
decisions ofthe district court."' Id. (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415 n.1 (2009)).
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITIED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DETERMINED
THAT NEUMEIER PREVAILED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

"A condition precedent is an event not certain to occur, but which must occur, before
performance under a contract becomes due." Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141
Idaho 123, 128 (2005). "A condition precedent may be expressed in the parties' agreement,
implied in fact from the conduct of the parties, or implied in law (constructive) where the
courts 'construct' a condition for the purpose of attaining a just result." Weisel v. Beaver
Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 528 (2011).
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The District Court held that Neumeier prevailed on summary judgment because at the
time of summary judgment Neumeier owed nothing on his bill ignoring the fact that Neumeier
owed the provider at the time MRS filed the Complaint. The District Court reasoned that in the
context of medical patients with insurance, a patient owes nothing on his bill until the insurer
pays and the amount due and owing becomes determinable. In other words, according to the
District Court, before Neumeier's performance under his contract with the medical provider
became due, Neumeier's medical insurer first needed to pay on the medical claim. This is a
condition precedent the District Court applied because it involves an event that must occur
before performance under a contract becomes due. However, there is no evidence that the
parties' agreement expressed such a condition precedent nor can such a condition precedent
be implied in fact from the conduct of the parties or in law by the court for the purpose of
attaining a just result.
1.

No Evidence Exists That The Parties Intended The Condition Precedent
The District Court Applied To The Contract Between The Parties.

Here, the record contains no written contract between the parties. Nor does the record
contain any evidence of any oral contract between the parties. Therefore, the District Court
could not have applied the condition precedent as an express term of a contract between the
parties. And the only evidence on appeal of the conduct of the parties regarding contract
formation is found in the Affidavit of Jared Neumeier that states, "On or about November 30,
2012, I went in to Dr. Eric Baird's office to get a colonoscopy. I provided my Blue Cross of Idaho
insurance information, was seen by Dr. Baird, and then left his office."43 Nothing in this

43

R Vol. I, p. 19.
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statement demonstrates conduct of the parties that gives rise to the condition precedent that
the District Court applied in this case.

2.

The District Court Wrongly Constructed An Implied In Law Condition
Precedent Because The Condition Precedent Is Not Necessary To Attain A
Just Result.

Although the District Court applied an implied in law condition that people with medical
insurance owe nothing on their bill until their medical insurer pays, the District Court provided
no explanation and no legal authority why implying such a condition is necessary to obtain a
just result. To the contrary, the District Court's position yields a very unjust result in this case.
Neumeier saw Dr. Baird on November 30, 2012 for a colonoscopy-something most
people (particularly men) do not forget that they underwent. The record shows that Neumeier
received Explanation of Benefit ("EOB") forms from his medical insurer yet never received an
EOB for his November 30, 2012 procedure until after MRS sued Neumeier. 44 This means that
between November 30, 2012 and May 18, 2015-two and one half years-Neumeier did
nothing to follow up with his provider or medical insurer to find out why he had never received
a bill or an EOB for his procedure. Neumeier did schedule and take a two week Disney Panama
Canal Cruise, but did nothing to find out why his doctor never billed him or why he never got an
EOB from his medical insurer. At any time during this two and one half year period, Neumeier
could have contacted the provider and asked why he had never gotten a bill or he could have
called his medical insurer and asked why he had never gotten an EOB related to a procedure he
never paid for or his medical insurer never paid for. Instead, he did neither and now asks the
court to impose a condition as a matter of law for the purpose of giving him a "just" result.
44

R Vol. I, p. 22.
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Moreover, On April 27, 2015, MRS sent Neumeier a 10-day demand letter after
obtaining Neumeier's correct address. 45 That collection letter told Neumeier he had a
delinquent account and 10 days to respond. 46 Because Neumeier was on vacation he did not
open the letter until May 16, 2015, a Saturday. 47 However, on Monday May 18, 2015, instead
of contacting MRS in response to the collection letter MRS had sent him, Neumeier contacted
Dr. Baird's office who told Neumeier his account had already gone to MRS for collections. 48
According to Neumeier, not until the next day on May 19, 2015 did Neumeier contact MRS who
told him that it was "too late." 49 If Neumeier had contacted MRS on Monday May 18, 2015
before MRS filed the Complaint at 4:01 p.m. and told MRS he had insurance, MRS would not
have filed suit but would have put the account on hold while awaiting his insurance payment. 50
MRS has a policy to put an insurance hold on an account if a person contacts MRS while
awaiting insurance payments. 51 Thus, even assuming billing and/or mailing errors by the
provider, if Neumeier would have responded to MRS when he had the opportunity, MRS would
not have sued him.
3.

The District Court's Analysis Is Based On A Faulty Characterization ofthe
Facts.

The District Court stated the following in its Decision:
In this case, no party disputes that once the procedure was performed, the
charges were subject to at least two adjustments before any amount could be
considered due and owing. First, where Neumeier had medical insurance, the charge
45

R Vol. I, pp. 19 and 71.

46

R Vol. I, p. 72.

47

R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.

48
49

50

51

I, pp. 107, 108 and 109.
I, pp. 108 and 109.
I, pp. 108 and 109.
I, p. 72.
I, p. 72.
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was subject to a contractual adjustment for the benefit of Neumeier and his insurer.
Second, the charge would be reduced by payments made by the insurer after the
contractual adjustment. 52
MRS disputes "that once the procedure was performed, the charges were subject to at
least two adjustments before any amount could be considered due and owing." The charge
was for $1,092.00. Pursuant to a contract between the medical insurer and the provider, this
charge was "adjusted" down by $665.41. 53 This is known as a "contractual adjustment." 54 The
balance after this contractual adjustment is the amount Neumeier was required to pay either
himself or by his medical insurer if he had coverage for the procedure. But a third party's
paying the balance is not an "adjustment," it is a payment made in behalf of the person owing
the balance. And the amount Neumeier owed the provider was considered "due and owing"
before the medical insurer made the payment. Neumeier actually owed the balance after he
had the procedure, and the provider was willing to accept payment from Neumeier, his medical
insurer, or anyone willing to pay it in his behalf. Neumeier's balance was not due and owing as
the District Court claims only after a third party paid the balance for him. In other words, the
District Court is wrong saying that the patient never owed any amounts the insurance company
pays.

4.

The District Court's Rule Is Contrary To Sound Reasoning And Sound
Public Policy.

The District Court's rule has the potential of leaving health care providers without a
remedy. For example, assume that a patient gets sued on a medical bill, and his defense is that

R Vol. I, p. 79.
R Vol. I, p. 22.
54 R Vol. I, p. 22.
52

53
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he has no obligation to pay because his medical insurer is supposed to pay the bill 100%. The
medical insurer refuses to pay claiming the patient did not pay his premiums or the procedure
is not covered under the insurance contract. Under the District Court's rule, the health care
provider is without a remedy because (1) no amount is due and owing from the patient until
the medical insurer pays; and (2) the health care provider cannot pursue the medical insurer
because they are not in privity with each other. No remedy.
Similarly, assume in the scenario above that the patient sues the medical insurer for
breach of the insurance contract. The provider would need to wait for the outcome of that
lawsuit before it could seek to collect from the patient because until that lawsuit is resolved
through the courts, the health care provider would not know whether the charges would be
reduced by payments made by the medical insurer. However, the health care provider must
still pay its overhead during the two or three years the case is in litigation. Assume further that
the patient and the medical insurer settled their case for a compromised sum that is much less
than the total medical charges. Litigation between the health care provider and the patient
might be necessary just to determine how much the settlement reduces the charges, if any.
The District Court's rule further removes from the patient the responsibility for payment
of medical services the patient receives. Generally speaking, patients have the responsibility of
paying their medical bills pursuant to express or implied in fact contracts for medical services
they have received. Patients can pay the medical bills themselves, buy medical insurance to
pay them, or they can make arrangements with charitable third parties to pay the medical bills.
But the purchase of medical insurance does not shift the contractual legal liability for payment
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away from the patient to the insurer, the provider, or a black hole. However, the District
Court's decision does just this causing the current system to stand on its head.
Moreover, as the party responsible for payment of medical services, patients with
medical insurance have remedies available for first party bad faith against their medical
insurers who do not pay when they ought to pay. On the other hand, health care providers do
not have any bad faith remedies available against medical insurers who do not pay pursuant to
insurance contracts with their insureds. Patients are incentivized to use these bad faith
remedies against a medical insurer when the health care provider seeks payment through
collection efforts from the patient. However, under the District Court's rule, patients have
virtually no incentive to pressure medical insurers for payment because the patient has no
responsibility for payment until the medical insurer pays. In reality, patients who know that
their medical insurer will pay only part of a medical bill have a disincentive to pressure their
medical insurer to pay their part because without any payment by a medical insurer a patient's
liability for a portion of the bill never arises. Thus, the District Court's decision actually
incentivizes patients in some instances to help their medical insurers avoid paying anything so
that the patients will never know what is "due and owing."
The District Court's rule promotes fraud by mischievous patients. For example, ifthe
District Court's decision is affirmed on appeal, when word of the decision gets out, a
mischievous patient could easily provide "insurance information" for a policy he knows is
cancelled. For months and months, the patient could tell the health care provider that he does
not owe the health care provider anything because the insurance company has not yet reduced
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the charge by its payment. The health care provider eventually could sue, but the primary issue
in litigation would be whether the patient has insurance, not what the patient owes on his bill.
The District Court's decision raises all kinds of questions about the adequacy of
"insurance information" the patient needs to provide to trigger the District Court's rule. For
example, does "insurance information" mean a copy of an insurance card, and if so, is that
front, back or both? If a patient provides the name of the insurance company, is that sufficient
"insurance information"? Is providing the policy number sufficient, or does a patient need to
provide the group number too? Is some combination required like the name of the insurance
company, the policy number, but not the group number? Or is it the name of the insurance
company, the group number, but not the policy number? Does the District Court's rule apply
to third party administrators who are not medical insurers, but who pay patient bills often as a
part of health insurance benefits for an employee? And, if so, does the District Court's ruling
extend to charities that pay some or all a patient's medical bill because only after the charge is
reduced by payments made by a charity could an amount due and owing be determined? All
these questions are better left to the Idaho legislature rather than the Idaho courts.
5.

The District Court Should Have Determined That MRS Prevailed On
Summary Judgment.

Instead of determining who won on summary judgment by looking at what Neumeier
owed MRS at the time of summary judgment, the District Court should have determined who
won on summary judgment by looking at what Neumeier owed MRS at the time MRS filed the
Complaint and recognized that Neumeier paid MRS after it filed suit but before summary
judgment. At the time MRS filed the Complaint, Neumeier owed MRS the balance ofthe
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charges after the contractual adjustment. If the Court does not determine who wins by looking
at what Neumeier owed at the time MRS filed the Complaint but looks at what Neumeier owed
at the time of summary judgment, the Court will be opening the door to an absurd litigation
tactic.
Specifically, this Court should readily foresee a future situation where a defendant
determines during litigation the amount he owes the plaintiff and strategically pays that
amount. The defendant would then move for summary judgment saying that he owes the
plaintiff nothing making summary judgment in his favor necessary. Worse yet, having won
summary judgment, a prevailing defendant could ask the trial court to award the defendant his
attorney's fees and costs. This litigation strategy would encourage potential defendants to wait
until getting sued before paying the amounts they owe because as happened in this case it
would turn the tables on a plaintiff who otherwise would be entitled to recover principle,
interest, attorney's fees and costs. Instead, the plaintiff who was owed money when he filed
the complaint would owe the defendant's attorney's fees and costs. This Court should not
sanction such a rule that encourages gamesmanship with the litigation process.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT NEUMEIER WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY.

The District Court found that the Magistrate Court did not abuse its discretion in finding
Neumeier to be the prevailing party for the reasons set forth by the District Court as to why
Neumeier prevailed on summary judgment. In addition, the District Court stated that the
Magistrate Court faced two options: "Rule in favor of Neumeier and dismiss MRS's action, or
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rule in favor of MRS for $0.00." 55 Either way, the District Court found that Neumeier prevailed,
and the Magistrate Court did not abuse its discretion.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B) states the following in pertinent part: "In
determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court
must, in its sound discretion, consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to
the relief sought by the respective parties." The determination of the prevailing party is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Odziemek v. Wesely, 102 Idaho 582 (Idaho
1981). A party need not be awarded affirmative relief in order to be the "prevailing party." Id;
Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172 (2009).

Here, MRS was the prevailing party because the result of the action was that MRS got
paid $383.93 in principle after having sought $958.63. The difference is the result of a
contractual adjustment owed to Neumeier that neither the health care provider nor MRS knew
about at the time MRS filed suit. Neumeier had no counterclaims. Although a party need not
be awarded affirmative reliefto be the "prevailing party," MRS recovered 40% of the principle
amount of the complaint.
Although plaintiff has been unable to locate any Idaho case law on this issue, at least
one California case has held that a defendant cannot pay a plaintiff the amount at issue after
filing the complaint to prevent the plaintiff from being a "prevailing party." In Joseph Magnin
Co. v. Schmidt, 89 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. 523 (App. Dep't Super Ct. 1978), a creditor

sued a debtor for money due on a retail installment contract. After filing the complaint, the
debtor paid the bill. The sole issue was whether the creditor was entitled to attorney's fees and
55
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costs as the 11 prevailing party" pursuant to statute. The trial court found that the creditor was
not the 11 prevailing party" and rendered judgment in favor of the debtor.
The Court on appeal reversed holding that where the debtor paid the creditor the
balance due on a retail installment contract after the creditor filed the complaint to recover the
money due on the retail installment contract, the creditor was the 11 prevailing party" and thus
entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs from the debtor. Joseph Magnin Co. v.

Schmidt, 89 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. 523 (App. Dep't Super Ct. 1978). Although the
precise issue in Joseph Magnin Co. was framed a little differently than here, the appellate
court's reasoning is spot on:
That neither law, equity, fairness nor justice requires that a defendant debtor be
entitled to delay payment of a debt in circumstances such as these until after a lawsuit
has been filed and thus defeat a plaintiff-creditor's entitlement to attorney's fees and
costs. What respondent seeks here is not merely a liberal interpretation of section
1811.1 but an emasculation of its purpose to reward defendants with good defenses
who risk sums for attorney's fees and advance costs in behalf of those good defenses.
Joseph Magnin Co. at 12.

Similarly, the decision to reward a defendant who delays payment until after a
complaint has been filed 11 emasculates" the purpose of Rule 54(d)(l)(B) that allows a creditor to
file a complaint to recover what it is owed including prejudgment interest, costs and attorney's
fees incurred to collect the debt. The District Court's decision, if allowed to stand, would
frustrate the purpose of what it means to be a 11 prevailing party." The District Court's decision
would also encourage unnecessary litigation because debtors would be incentivized not to pay
until a complaint is filed-after all, if the creditor does not file a complaint, the debtor never
has to pay, but if the creditor sues, the debtor pays the creditor what the debtor owed the
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creditor anyway without attorney's fees, costs, or prejudgment interest. And a creditor would
be punished for taking appropriate steps to collect what it is rightfully owed because the
creditor would not recover attorney's fees, costs and prejudgment interest.
For all these reasons, the District Court committed reversible error in affirming the
Magistrate Court's finding that Neumeier was the prevailing party because the Magistrate
Court abused its discretion in finding that Neumeier was the prevailing party.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT MRS SHOULD BE AWARDED NO
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.

MRS should still be the prevailing party because the District Court should have awarded
MRS an affirmative judgment that included prejudgment interest. The District Court agreed
with the Magistrate Court that MRS was not entitled to prejudgment interest for two reasons:
First, for all the reasons set forth by the District Court in its Decision on Appeal, "when it could
finally be determined whether any charges were owing, there were none." 56 The Magistrate
Court stated it this way: "[l]nterest is calculated on a percentage of the amount owed and not
the amount claimed in the complaint. Any percentage of $0 is still $0." 57 Second, the District
Court found that "[t]he amount charged went through a series of adjustments before it could
be determined that there was an amount owed. As such, there was no liquidated amount
owed which could be an award of pre-judgment interest." 58

56
57
58
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MRS disagrees with the District Court that "a prejudgment interest determination is
reviewed under a discretionary standard, and the same three-prong test applies." 59 MRS
contends that although a court has discretion to determine whether an amount claimed for
prejudgment interest is capable of mathematical computation, whether to award prejudgment
interest after this determination presents an issue of law for the court. Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho
277 (Ct. App. 2007). The standard of review on questions of law is free review. Ranson v.
Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641 (2006).

MRS sought prejudgment interest in paragraphs four and five of its Complaint pursuant
to I.C. § 18-22-104, which states in pertinent part:
(1)

When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest,
interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12C) on the hundred by the year
on:
2.

Money after the same becomes due.

***
6.

Money due upon open accounts after (3) months from the date of the
last item.

The law is clear that "interest should be allowed as a matter of law from the date the sum

became due in cases where the amount claimed, even though not liquidated, is capable of
mathematical computation." Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 137 (1971)(Emphasis Added).
Here, the amount of prejudgment interest MRS is entitled to recover is capable of
mathematical computation. Neumeier received services on November 30, 2012 and paid

59
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$383.93 on August 27, 2015 to pay the debt in full. 60 This means that beginning February 28,
2013 (starting three months from the date of service) until August 27, 2015 (when Neumeier
paid the debt in full), Neumeier's debt incurred $114.86 interest. The mathematical
computation is simply the total number of days from February 28, 2013 to August 27, 2015, i.e.,
910 days, multiplied by 12% on the amount of $383.93, i.e., .01262235 dollars per day for 910
days for a total of $114.86.
The District Court stated that "there was no liquidated amount owed which could be the
basis of an award of pre-judgment interest" because "[t]he amount charged went through a
series of adjustments before it could be determine that there was an amount owed." 61 First,
the law is clear that even if the amount owed was not "liquidated," interest should be allowed
as a matter of law from the date the sum became due in cases where the amount claimed is
capable of mathematical computation. Second, the amount charged did not go through a
series of adjustments. Instead, the amount charged was subject to just one contractual
adjustment. But the contractual adjustment is treated just like a credit before suit is filed
because it was owed all along. Therefore, the contractual adjustment is simply part of the
mathematical computation to determine the amount claimed.
Although MRS has not been able to locate any Idaho case directly in point, the case of
State Drywall, Inc. v. Rhodes Design & Dev., 122 Nev. 111, 116-18 (2006) is helpful. In State
Drywall, Inc. the Nevada Supreme court explained why prejudgment interest should be

60
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awarded on amounts paid after a Complaint is filed but before judgment is entered. The
Supreme Court of Nevada explained in relevant part:
We now turn to whether State Drywall should have been awarded prejudgment
interest on the two payments Rhodes made to State Drywall after State Drywall filed its
complaint but before trial. Rhodes contends that the district court correctly denied
prejudgment interest on those payments because they are not technically part of the
judgment ... When a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning is clear
and unmistakable, we may not look beyond the statute for a different meaning or
construction. The plain language of NRS 99.040(1) states that for cases falling under its
purview, interest must be allowed "upon all money from the time it becomes due." The

statute in no way limits prejudgment interest only to amounts contained within the
court's ultimate judgment. Rather, prejudgment interest should be calculated for "all
money" owed under the contract from the date it becomes due until the date it is paid
or an offer of judgment is made. Our prior case law and Nevada public policy also
support this conclusion.
In First Interstate Bank v. Green, we concluded that prejudgment interest under
NRS 99.040(1) should be added to money paid before trial where defendant deliberately
deprives the plaintiff of the money's use for some specified time. In that case, a suit to
recover an overpayment was filed, but before trial, the plaintiff consented to
Neumeier's offer of judgment for the amount overpaid, plus interest thereon and
attorney fees. Defendant paid the amount due but did not pay interest or attorney fees.
Although the district court had determined that interest was not recoverable, we
reversed, holding that "[w]here a party is entitled to repayment on a certain date, and
payment is not made, interest is recoverable from the date due." The rationale for our
holding in First Interstate Bank was that defendant deprived the plaintiff of money to
which the plaintiff was entitled. Therefore, in order to compensate the plaintiff
adequately for the time it was deprived of its funds, defendant was required to pay
interest.
In addition to the adequate compensation rationale expressed in First Interstate
Bank, our conclusion that prejudgment interest is owed on contract amounts paid

during litigation also serves an important public policy goal. If interest were not
recoverable on amounts owed to the plaintiff and paid by defendant after the
complaint was filed but before trial, then a defendant worried about losing at trial
could pay some or all of the money before trial and avoid paying interest on that
amount. Such a result is fundamentally unfair. A defendant in a collection case could
then avoid interest, yet still delay payment until just before trial. Permitting this tactic
would circumvent the mandates of our prejudgment interest statutes.
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State Drywall, Inc. v. Rhodes Design & Dev., 122 Nev. 111, 116-18, 127 P.3d 1082, 1086-87

(2006)(1nternal Citations Omitted)(Emphasis Added).
Allowing a debtor to pay a creditor the amount owed after the complaint is filed but not
permit the creditor to recover all amounts of prejudment interest due and owing at the time of
filing the complaint is bad public policy because it encourages needless litigation. Debtor
defendants would be encouraged not to pay debts until sued because they might get lucky and
never be sued. The Nevada Supreme Court explained it exactly right when it said, "A defendant

in a collection case could then avoid interest, yet still delay payment until just before trial.
Permitting this tactic would circumvent the mandates of our prejudgment interest statutes."
State Drywall, Inc. at 118 (Emphasis added). Debtors should be encouraged to pay amounts

owed before filing suit and not rewarded with a bonus of avoiding interest by waiting until
paying only after a creditor files suit.
In summary, the District Court erred in determining that the amount of interest claimed
was not capable of mathematical computation. The District Court also committed reversible
error when it found that MRS could not recover any prejudgment interest based on the District
Court's analysis that there never was any amount actually due and owing. Finally, the District
Court committed reversible when it found that MRS was not entitled to be the "prevailing
party" for having obtained an affirmative judgment with the inclusion of prejudgment interest.

111.
MRS IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL
Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate Rules permits the award of costs to the prevailing party
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on appeal. Rule 40 states, "[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party
unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." As the prevailing party on appeal,
MRS is entitled to recover its costs pursuant to Rule 40. Similarly, Rule 41 provides for an
award of attorney's fees. A prevailing party on appeal is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal if
that prevailing party was entitled to attorney's fees before the lower court. Action Collection
Servs., Inc., v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286, 291, 192 P.3d 1110, 1115 (Ct. App. 2008).
In this case, MRS was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. §12-120(1) & (3) before
the Magistrate Court because this matter was filed as a civil action to recover on an open
account, account stated, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of services within the
meaning of Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 62 Moreover, the amount pleaded in the Complaint was
also less than thirty-five thousand dollars and written demand for payment was made not less
than ten days before commencement ofthe action. 63 Because MRS was entitled to fees
pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(1) & (3) before the Magistrate Court, MRS is also entitled to its
appellate attorney's fees pursuant to I.A.R. 41.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth in this Brief, MRS respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the District Court's Opinion and Order on Appeal finding:
1. MRS prevailed on summary judgment;
2.

62

63

MRS is the prevailing party;
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3. MRS is entitled to prejudgment interest; and

4.

and costs below and before this Court.
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